What does it mean to be (seen as) human? In this talk, I explore this question and show that the attribution of gender is a critical component of seeing someone—or something—as human. Given gender’s primacy in social cognition, I propose that gender is linked to “seeing human” in a way that cannot be said of other social categories (i.e., race, age, sexual orientation, religion, or disability). I test this hypothesis in a number of studies that induce humanization (i.e., anthropomorphism) and measure social-category ascription, as well as those that include (versus remove) gendered information and measure humanization. I then present new work that explores gendered cognition using “non-binary” stimuli and among non-binary individuals. Finally, I explore the implications of gendered cognition for people’s preferences for, and attachment to, gendered technology. These findings underscore the importance of gender in humanization and have theoretical and practical implications for research on gender, (de)humanization, and social cognition, as well as for current discussions on gender neutrality.